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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. I Published by the Undergraduates of the
Washington University Law School No.
STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL
OF CARRIERS.
The legal problems that confront the carriers of our country,
and the laws and decisions that make for the prosperity or destruc-
tion of these necessary arteries of commerce, are of vital interest
to our profession. A great mass of our citizenship is directly or
remotely interested in the proper management and control of com-
mon carriers, and thousands of interdependent industries are like-
wise affected thereby. The State and Federal Governments, in
their dual capacities, have, of recent years, taken over the control
and regulation of common carriers, and they are thus directly con-
cerned in securing the most scientific laws for the regulation of
carriers, since the development of the resources of the State and
Nation and the commercial prosperity of our people are largely
dependent thereon. Clearly, then, that which is of such vital im-
portance to our country necessarily concerns the laywer, for he
is interested in all governmental questions.
It is not with the rights of the shareholders or security holders
of these quasi-public companies, as opposed to the right of the State
or Federal Government to regulate and control these privately
owned properties, that we shall concern ourselves, since this dis-
cussion would be purely academic at the present day. Nor shall
we enter the broad field of legal learning to consider, under our
basic organic system, whether the foundations for such a fourth
department of government, known as "Government by Commis-
sion", which is not judicial, legislative or executive, yet limits and
controls the rights of property, were wisely or legally laid beside the
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beneficent institutions of our Constitutional Government.' Omit-
ting from the discussion, therefore, the idea of the sacrifice of in-
dividual right from such a system of government and the consti-
tutional right or power, according to our principles of government
to enter upon such a policy, confining the discussion alone to the
interest of the people served by these privately owned State and
Government controlled agencies of commerce, let us see if the present
system is along scientific lines.
If the present State and Federal control and regulation of
carriers result in conflicts and inconsistencies, with resulting penalties
and burdens, which injuriously affect the service, which these State
and Federal controlled agencies of transportation are able to render
the people, then there is something radically wrong with the system.
Organized originally to preserve the public interest, through the
control and regulation of these public service corporations whose
general conduct, by public statutes, the legislatures were unable
to properly regulate and control, since the establishment of Com-
mission Government, the passing years have brought such a mass
of inconsistent and conflicting legislation and burdens2 that rail-
road receiverships have become the order of the day, and financial
ruin to the carriers and their interdependent industries, with in-
creasing inability to render the service demanded by the public,
has resulted. This deplorable condition of the interstate carriers
in the United States is due largely to the fact that they have had
to meet at one and the same time, not only the two conflicting
legislative theories of unrelated and opposite character, of the State
and Federal Governments, but they have, at the same time, been
"'In spite of the judicial bulwark there lurks a real danger in the exist-
ence and operation of this fourth department of government, for in democ-
racies there is a consistent distrust of officials who are outside of popular
control, and commissions appointed by the executive for definite tcrms,
and removable only by him upon charges, are not responsible to the body
from which they gef their power or to the people." (See article "Govern-
ment by Commission," by Lindsay Rogers, 21 "Case and Comment," No.
11, p. 907, April, 1915.)
2"The .State of New York was the pioneer, establishing a railread com-
mission in 1855. Massachusetts followed in 1869, but the former experi-
ment was unsuccessful. In New York, however, the problem was most
acute, as is natural by reason of the services necessary for the congested
population, and the State was the first to begin commission regulation
upon an extensive scale. Wisconsin acted at the same time (1907), but
the New York law, as amended in 1910, 1911 and 1912, probably delegates
most comprehensive powers, the commission being authorized to regulate
rates and service, to make investigations, require reports on business con-
ditions," etc. Article by Lindsay Rogers, "Government by Commission,"
supra.
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bound and controlled by the inconsistent and conflicting laws, rules
and orders of the various States through which the lines of railroads
run, while primarily obligated to obey the lawful orders of the
Interstate Commission. The application, at the same time, of
such opposite and conflicting theories of supervision must ulti-
mately lead to Government ownership or exclusive Federal con-
trol of these interstate agencies of commerce, if their service and
usefulness to the people is to be maintained.2 a I have always been
a firm believer in what is popularly termed "State's Rights" and
have been thoroughly grounded in the principle that the power
resides in the several States, when not forbidden by the Consti-
tution, to regulate and control, by law, the relative rights and
duties of all persons and corporations within the State, and thereby
to provide for the public convenience and the good of society, 3 and
have always viewed with alarm any encroachment by the Federal
Government upon this constitutional power of the States. How-
ever, to give due effect to our Constitution, when the State police
power and the Federal commercial power come in conflict, the
State power, under the organic law, must yield, for otherwise we
could not have a Federal Government at all, if the various States
could set at naught its constitutionally delegated power.
4
This naturally suggests the question: What is the source of
power of the respective Federal and State governments over carriers?
Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States
grants to Congress the power: "to regulate commerce with foreign
natiohs and among the several States."
Section 2, Article VI, of the Federal Constitution, provides that:
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme law of the
land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith-
standing."
By the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respect-
ively, or to the people."
Under these constitutional provisions, while the Federal Gov-
2
aThere are now 41,988 miles of railroad in the United States in the
hands of receivers, representing a total funded debt of $1,475,385,755.00.
(Railway Age Gazette, October 15th, 1915, Vol. 59, No. 15, p. 676.)
'Lake Shore vs. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; 43 L. Ed. 702.
'Arkansas vs. K. & T. Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185; 46 L. Ed. 144.
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ernment exercises delegated power only over carriers engaged in
interstate commerce, in the exercise of such power it is supreme, and
the power of the several States, over this subject, as to any of the
powers delegated to Congress, depends upon whether Congress has
exercised the power so delegated. In the exercise of their respective
powers over carriers, both the Federal and State Governments are
limited by the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, guaranteeing due process of law in the
protection of life, liberty or property, and preventing the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation.
These provisions of the Constitution furnish the basis for the con-
trol by the courts of the unbridled power on the part of the com-
missions, State and Federal.5
While the United States Supreme Court recognizes the right
of the several States, under the Constitution, to regulate the charges
of public service companies', the courts not only hold that it is
within the judicial power, but a duty of the courts, to restrain any-
thing which, in the form of a regulation of rates, operates to deny
to the owners of property invested in the business of transporta-
tion that equal protection of the laws which, by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no State can deny to any citizen.7 The ill-advised
and extreme legislation of various states against carriers has caused
the Federal courts, in many cases, to apply the constitutional guar-
anty to the owners of property devoted to the business of trans-
portation, and the wholesome tendency of the United States Supreme
Court seems to be in the direction that interstate carriers must,
in substantial respects, be subject to but. one power, and that
regulations of intrastate commerce, which have the immediate
or indirect effect of imposing a burden upon interstate commerce
are inconsistent with the power delegated to Congress by the Con-
stitution.8 The Supreme Court of the United States, in construing
the Interstate Commerce Act', in the case of Texas & Pacific R. R.
Go. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, said: "It would be difficult
'See Article, "Judicial Control of Commissions," by Lawrence B. Evans,
21 "Case and Comment," No. 11, P. 895.6Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. vs. N. C. Com., 206 U. S. 1; 51 L. Ed. 933.7See Justice Brewer's Opinion in Regan vs. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U. S. 362; 38 L. Ed. 1014; 4 I. C. C. Rep. 560; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047.
'Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. vs. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334.
Robbins vs. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; 30 L. Ed. 694; 162 U. S. 197;
40 L. Ed. 945.
9Sec. 8563, Vol. IV, U. S. Comtp. St. 1913. And see Houston Ry. Co.
vs. United States, 234 U. S. 341; 58 L. Ed. 1341.
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to use language more unmistakably signifying that Congress had
in view the whole field of commerce (excepting commerce wholly
within a State), as well that between the States and Territories,
as that going to or coming from foreign countries.
"In a later part of the section it is declared that 'the term
transportation shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or
carriage.'
"It has thus included in its scope the entire commerce of the
United States, foreign and interstate, and subjected to its regula-
tions all carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or
property, by whatever instrumentalities of shipment or carriage."
In the case of New York Central R. R. vs. Hudson County,
227 U. S. 248, it was said: "An assertion of power by Congress
over a subject within its domain must be treated as coterminous with
its authority over the subject, and leaves no element of the subject
to control of the State."
"The operation at one time of both the power of Congress and
that of the State over a matter of interstate commerce is incon-
ceivable; the execution of the greater power takes possession of the
field and leaves nothing upon which the lesser power can operate."
In the case of Erie R. R. Co. vs. New York, 233 U. S. 671, it was
said: "When Congress acts in such manner as to manifest its
constitutional authority in regard to interstate commerce, the
regulating power of the State ceases to exist, and if there is conflict
between State and Federal legislation, the former must give way.
After Congress acts on a matter within its exclusive jurisdiction,
there is no division of the field of regulation."
As recently shown in an excellent paper before the Tennessee
State Bar Association"0 , this constitutional right to have an exclu-
sive regulation of interstate commerce by Congress is a right of the
several States to prevent discrimination against the citizens of
each, since it is a matter of supreme importance to each State to
prevent anything calculated to injure its trade and commerce or
to paralyze the industrial development of the State. The con-
stitutional power was lodged in Congress to overcome the greed
and selfishness of the various individual States, in the race for
commercial supremacy, following the Revolutionary War, when
Virginia, by her export duties and inspection laws, sought to keep
her tobacco at home; Massachusetts prohibited the exportation of
1See Address of Hon. Alfred P. Thom before the State Bar Association
of Tennessee, June 25th, 1915, at Chattanooga.
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grain and leather; New York, by her import duties, sought to exclude
the firewood from Connecticut and the butter and dairy products
from New Jersey; and these and various other States, by a narrow
system of local retaliatory laws regulating various articles of com-
merce, materially retarded the development of the country".
When adopted originally, to prevent the serious results of sec-
tional strife, this salutary constitutional provision is certainly
broad enough to prevent a similar result of such ill-advised State
legislation as now threatens to destroy the usefulness of the country's
interstate transportation system. It is of the greatest practical
importance to maintain an adequate and efficient transportation
agency, and any policy of legislation or regulation that fails to
preserve the continuity of the service of the carriers of the country
is at variance with the fundamental reasons which gave rise to the
lodgment of the constitutional power in Congress regarding com-
merce. Just as it was originally essential to adopt a provision
of organic law to protect the commerce of the country from ill-
advised laws of the several independent and sovereign States, and,
later, an act of Congress, to render more efficient to the public
the service of interstate carriers, so it is now essential that the
efficiency of this service shall not be destroyed by the imposition
of burdens which must eventually bankrupt such agencies of trans-
portation, and the carriers must be preserved from the legislation
of States which reduce rates below the fair cost of transportation
for the benefit of their own citizens, or laws intended solely to pre-
serve the local markets for State trade, thus discriminating against
the citizens of adjoining States and interfering with the efficiency
of the agencies of transportation by demanding service at less than
its actual cost. If the efficiency of the service and the financial
responsibility of interstate carriers is to be left to State regulation,
then each of the several States can and will establish a standard
all its own and the service of the other States and the success of a
financial plan that may meet with the approval of a majority of the
States through which a line of road is built can be jeopardized or
set aside by the action of any one State.
Every bond issue, for instance, of companies engaged in inter-
state commerce must meet the approval of the commissions of the
different States through which the railroad runs, and different fees
for the required authority to issue such negotiable instruments must
nFiske's "Critical Period of American History," p. 144.
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be paid upon the total issue in all the States, where such legal re-
quirements obtain. Thus, the Illinois Utility Act12 provides that
"All stock * * * and every bond, note or other evidence of
indebtedness * * * issued without an order of the Commission
authorizing the same then in effect shall be void", etc.
That this Act, requiring the financial indebtedness which has
the approval of the State of the domicile of the carrier to be ap-
proved by another State at the price of the fees to be paid, under
the law, or suffer the penalty of having the lien upon the property
and contract of the foreign State voided, denies full faith and credit
to the Acts of the sister State and imposes a direct burden upon
interstate commerce, I have no doubt"3 , yet it is but one of many
similar Acts upon the statute books. The financial responsibility
and the legality of the commercial paper of a carrier, whose lines of
road extend through many States, are matters of most vital concern
to the citizens of all such States which should not be left to the
determination of the legislatures of any one of such States or to the
whim or caprice of any State Commission.4
If such important contract rights as these can be stricken down
unless the fiat of a given State Commission is procured, then the
sacred right of contract, guaranteed by Section 10, Article I, of
the Constitution, and the full faith and credit clause of Section
1, Article IV, of this immortal document, are but high-sounding
phrases.
Space will only permit the mention of a few of the many State
laws and regulations which discriminate against the commerce of
the other States or against interstate commerce. Although the
Interstate Commerce Commission has provided for no penalty
for a delay in furnishing freight cars, the laws of many of the dif-
ferent States prescribe penalties ranging from a dollar a day to
several dollars a day for failure to furnish such cars. Thus, in
times of a car shortage, to avoid the penalty, the carrier would be
compelled to favor the most prejudiced or unreasonable State be-
cause no disinterested authority is provided for the regulation of
the distribution of cars. Although Congress has enacted an ade-
12Section 23, Illinois Utility Act of 1913.
"Laird vs. B. & 0. R. Co., 131 Md. 179; 88 Atl. Rep. 348.
Western Union Co. vs. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1.
Canada Southern R. Co. vs. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527.
14"And yet sixteen States have enacted statutes, each asserting for itself
the individual right to control the issue of stocks and bonds of interstate
carriers." (Paper of Hon. Alfred P. Thorn before Tennessee Bar Associa-
tion, June 25th, 1915, at Chattanooga.)
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quate and reasonable Hours of Service Act and Safety Appliance
Act, many of the States have passed similar laws, with different
hours of service for employees engaged in the operation of trains
and additional safety provisions from those required by the Federal
law. Although it is to the interest of the general public to have
cars and engines repaired where the most efficient work can be ob-
tained, several States have passed laws attempting to compel carriers
who have shops in such States, to have all cars and engines repaired
inside the State. By the decisions of some of the States, a carrier
is liable for a few hours' delay in failing to deliver livestock in time
for the early morning market 5 , while, under the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, the payment of a claim based upon such a
delay, in the face of the provisions in the Uniform Livestock Contract,
would constitute an unlawful discrimination."5 Upon beneficent
considerations of humanity, Congress, by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act of 1908, and the amendment of 1910, has provided
for the compensation for injuries or death of employees of carriers
engaged in interstate commerce, under the broad grant of power
conferred by the Constitution to regulate commerce. A different
measure of damages in case of death and a different procedure for
the computation of damages for injuries than obtain in most of
the States are established by this law, which has given rise to in-
numerable conflicts with the courts of the different States. Of course,
having acted upon the subject, the Act of Congress is exclusive
in actions by interstate employees, but the conflicts between the
two jurisdictions are a source of no little concern to the interstate
carrier.17
The utter impracticability and destructive policy of the present
dual system of regulation of interstate carriers is best illustrated,
however, in the efforts on the part of the carriers to procure suf-
ficient revenue to meet the fixed charges necessary to give the ser-
vice required by the public. Although created, among other things,
to perform impartially the duty of fixing reasonable intrastate rates,
some of the various State Commissions have not only consistently
and arbitrarily refused to grant reasonable increases asked in State
rates, but have conceived it to be within the line of their duty to
15Anderson vs. Ry. Co., 93 Mo. App. 677.
Lay vs. R. R., 157 Mo. App. 474.
"6Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. vs. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; 56 L. Ed. 1033.
17See Roberts' "Federal Employers' Liability Act."
Recent paper by Hon. Jacob Trieber before Arkansas State Bar Associa-
tion, 49 American Law Review, P. 481.
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defend, through their representatives, in the name of the people of
the State, all efforts on the part of the carriers to secure reasonable
increases in interstate rates. 8 It is clearly a misconception of the
duty of a State Commission to assume that they were created to
appear in the role of counsel against the carriers in another forum
where they are seeking relief, yet we find the records of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission replete with instances where State
Commissions have so recorded themselves. 9 In the most recent of
these cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission, where
some of the Western State Commissions appeared, by their repre-
sentatives, to oppose the increases asked by the carriers, the argu-
ment was advanced that the increases should be refused because
the interstate rates were already higher than the State rates, although
the revenue realized on both classes of business showed a loss to
the carriers." It was shown in this case that, of the eleven two-
cent passenger fare States in the United States, while the railroads
enjoyed less advantages and received the lowest passenger fares
of any section of the country, the nine Western two-cent fare States
of Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska,
Missouri, Oklahoma and Kansas were, comparatively, the most
prosperous subdivision of agricultural territory in the United States
and the cost of the service to the carrier was above the average in
this section." In the Eastern Advance Rate Case;, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission found that the passenger rates were
too low to pay the cost of the service, yet the average density of
population per mile in these States was 1,036, while, in the nine
Western States above referred to, the average density of population
per mile was only 323.
Upon the reasonableness of the three-cent per mile interstate
passenger rate charged by the carriers in Missouri, Arkansas and
Oklahoma, the Interstate Commerce Commission recently held,
in the case wherein the Commissions of these States attacked this
rate as unreasonable, that:
"While the method of estimating values and apportioning
cost and revenues are not accurate, we are satisfied, after a
1835 I. C. C. Rep. 498-501.
"Western Advance Rate Case, 35 . C. C. 498-500.
Eastern Advance Rate Case, 31 1. C. C. 351; 32 I. C. C. 343; 24 I. C. C.
380
Mo., Kan. and Ark. Passenger Rate Case, 22 I. C. C. 160.
"Western Advance Rate Case, 35 I. C. C. 668.2"ante idem.
"31 I. C. C. 351.
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careful examination of the evidence, that the margin of error
which may be imputed to them is not sufficient to change our
conclusion, which is that, from all the evidence, to base inter-
state passenger rates from and to Arkansas, Missouri and
Oklahoma on, three cents a mile does not result in rates that
we are convinced are unreasonable, in violation of the Act to
Regulate Commerce.
" * * * We do not feel justified in condemning the rates
complained of as unreasonable." 3
Notwithstanding this decision by the Commission, delegated
by Congress with the duty of regulating commerce between these
States, the discrimination between interstate and State passengers
in this territory and the confiscation of the property of the carriers
in these States in thus being required to furnish transportation at
less than cost have continued. And not only have these States
failed to grant relief against this condition, which the Federal Com-
mission recommended should be remedied, but, generally, they have
exhibited a tendency to require unreasonable and extravagant ex-
penditures by the carriers, in the erection of expensive passenger
stations at relatively small towns, elimination of grade crossings, in-
creasing the number of employees upon trains, and increased pas-
senger trains in sections where the travel did not justify such ser-
vice.
In the Minnesota Rate Case, when the same was before the
United States Court of Appeals, Judge Sanborn, answering the
argument that "The reduction of local rates does not interfere
with interstate rates, as a matter of law," conclusively showed that
while such reduction did not, "as a matter of law," interfere with
interstate rates, yet that it did, as a matter of fact, have that effect.
It was conclusively established in the Minnesota Case, and, ever
since, has been a question of which the courts have taken judicial
notice, that the schedules fixed for intrastate transportation neces-
sarily disturbed the equilibrium existing between State and inter-
state rates. All interstate rates naturally embrace the border
cities and, when rates to these cities are included in a general reduc-
tion on intrastate rates, there is, of course, a change in the relation
of rates theretofore existing to adjacent towns across the State
line. For instance, a low intrastate rate to St. Louis, Missouri,
would result in a corresponding decrease in the rate to East St.
2Commissions of Oklahoma, Missouri and Arkansas vs A., T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. e al. (July 18th, 1914), 31 1. C. C. 532.
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Louis, Illinois. This, and the general effect upon interstate rates
on given commodities resulting from an unreasonably low intra-
state rate have the natural effect of discriminating between the
rates, interstate and intrastate.
In the recent case involving the validity of the Missouri rate
on grain from various interior points to St. Louis, where the State
rate was less than the interstate rate, the same conclusion reached
by Judge Sanborn in the Minnesota Rate Case was applied by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and it was held that, in the
maintenance of interstate rates higher than the intrastate rates
from interior Missouri points to St. Louis, an unlawful prejudice
and advantage was given to St. Louis and an unjust discrimination
was effected against the interior Missouri cities, East St. Louis and
Southern Illinois points24 The carriers are daily compelled by the
different States to continue equally discriminatory rates in effect
which should be remedied by the same extra-state authority, since
the States, for one reason or another, fail or refuse to remedy. In
States where the intrastate freight and passenger rates are lower
than the interstate rates, the interstate rate is frequently discrim-
inated against by the quite prevalent custom of "scalping" the
interstate rate. Interstate passengers frequently buy tickets to
the last station in the State, to take advantage of the State rate,
and again buy tickets for the remainder of the interstate journey
and ,nterstate freight is often billed and rebilled the same way.
Of course, this constitutes an unlawful discrimination against the
interstate rate and the Interstate Commerce Commission has
recently so held", but the carriers are, themselves, powerless to
prevent the practice, and thus discrimination and confiscation of
property continues because of the conflicts in the matter of rates
between the State and Federal regulating bodies.
Another notable conflict between the Federal and State regu-
lation of carriers arises in the inconsistent provisions regarding the
valuation of the properties of the carriers. Congress has provided,
in what was intended as a very comprehensive law, for the valuation
of the properties of interstate carriers under certain rules and orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission."5 Under the supervision
of the Interstate Commission, the valuation of various properties
"Merchants Exchange vs. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 34 1. C. C. 341.
And see Houston R. Co. vs. United States, 234 U. S. 341; 40 L. Ed. 1341.2 Kanatex Ref. Co. vs. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 34 I. C. C. 271.
1637 U. S. Statutes at Large, ch. 92, p. 701.
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of interstate carriers has been completed at a tremendous cost to
both the Government and the carriers. Speaking of the compre-
hensive character of this Federal Valuation Act, Commissioner
Clark, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, recently said:'-
"The law which was adopted for this purpose is exhaustive
and requires the performance of a vast amount of detail work
and the determination of many vexed and vastly important
questions. No one has blazed the path. The results ought
to be sound, equitable and right. When these valuations are
finally fixed, they will be of great assistance to the Commission
and to the courts in connection with cases which involve alleged
confiscation of property of carriers."
But, notwithstanding this work of Federal valuation, carried
on in pursuance of this exclusive power of Congress over the subject
of interstate carriers, the laws and orders of many of the States
have also provided for a separate and distinct valuation of the prop-
erties of interstate carriers, located within the several States,
by different rules and according to various standards of efficiency.28
The Twentieth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce pro-
hibits interstate carriers from keeping any accounts or records other
than those approved by the Commission, yet, in many States, other
and additional records and accounts are required, as in Kansas
under the Mahin Act.2 9  Cuspidors, combs and brushes are required
by the laws of some States to be kept in the coaches for the use
of the passengers, while adjoining States make the presence of such
articles a violation of law and different inconsistent provisions
exist in adjoining States as to drinking water and other beverages
upon a train. If space would permit, we could continue the catalogue
of inconsistent State and Federal laws and orders regulating inter-
state carriers until the reader's patience was exhausted.
Too frequently the opinion has prevailed with the State regu-
lating bodies that the right to regulate carries with it the implied
obligation that the regulation shall always be in favor of the patrons
of the regulated agency and against the agency itself. The Presi-
dent of one State Commission has publicly proclaimed that this
is the sole and sufficient object of State regulation, since the indus-
try to be regulated is more than able to take care of itself.10 When
2
-Article, "Interstate Commerce Commission and Its Work," Railway
Age Gazette, Sept. 17, 1915, P. 494.28Sec. 28, ch. 238, Laws Kansas 1911.
29Kansas Acts, 1913.
3OPaper of J. M. Eshleman, President, California R. R. Com., 21 Case
and Comment, No. 11, p. 1.
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the rights of the carrier can frequently only be enforced by the
State Commission, where such a policy obtains, it must, inevitably,
result in financial ruin, just as the continued and daily loss of im-
portant cases, involving valuable personal or property rights, must
inevitably produce financial ruin and bankruptcy of the individual
citizen. With such regulation, the railroads, like Micawber, have
been forced to contract obligations, with a view to their immediate
liquidation, which remain unliquidated through their sheer in-
ability to liquidate. The investor in the securities of the carrier
and the patrons of the road are almost as directly interested in the
carrier's regulation as the carrier itself, for the regulation of the
business of the carrier will determine its ability to meet its obliga-
tions and render efficient service to the public."
Although the public interest in transportation is that it should
be efficient and adequate, the plain fact remains that a conditon
now exists in which almost every burden has been placed upon the
transportation agencies that human ingenuity can devise. Legislation,
in accordance with sound economic principles, formu-
lated with a due regard to justice and individual right, is what we
should all be striving for. It is high time that the sober common
sense of the American lawyer was aroused upon this subject of
State and Federal regulation of carriers. It is intolerable that
the commerce of the country should be made to depend upon the
whim or caprice of any four or five members of a State Commission,
and it was to remedy this condition that the constitutional power
was lodged in Congress to regulate commerce among the several
States. What right has an individual State to impose a burden
upon interstate commerce, which the people of another State should
bear? The Constitution, itself, reflects the prevalent demand
of the people of all the States for protection in trade against the
barriers imposed by the individual States, and it is peculiarly a right
of the several States to enjoy this constitutional protection. The
commerce of a country that seeks all markets without regard to
political subdivisions cannot be halted at State lines, either by
physical interruption or inconsistent local regulation. Nor can
its efficiency and usefulness be left to the conflicting views of many
masters with differing sentiments of public policy and varying
conceptions of the problems presented. The interest which demands
that the transportation facilities shall extend in physical contin-
uity across State lines necessarily requires the same unity of con-
31See Article of H. A. Smith, Vol. 21, Case and Comment, No. 11, p. 879.
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trol, which is only possibly by Government regulation. These
are the underlying reasons why the States, by the Constitution,
confided to the general Government the regulation of interstate
commerce. We move along our daily paths, in periods of public
tranquility, without much concern about the great business of
the public's interest. Our patriotic President and members of the
Interstate Commerce Commission have recently given public utter-
ances of their apprehensions regarding the grave problem of Federal
and State regulation of carriers.12
The ray of danger that confronts our Republic is, that, to
escape from the disappointing and unsatisfactory results arising
from the conflict of the State and Federal authorities over rail-
roads, the condition may add to the already growing movement
in favor of the nationalization of our interstate railroads. Public
ownership is, of course, opposed to the traditional policy of our
Government and the historic development of its institutions. The
danger of abuse through party control of such vast properties,
representing such a large share of the wealth of our country, and
the voting strength of the army of railway employees, would be
inimical to the interests of the institutions of any popular Govern-
ment. It is claimed that public ownership would secure lower
rates of transportation, but this has not been the effect in Europe
nor on the only publicly owned railways which this Government
has, for, upon the Alaska and Panama Railways the rates for both
freight and passengers are largely in excess of those upon the pri-
vately owned railways in this country. The fair adjustment of
rates between different communities and on different articles of
traffic is of the highest consequence to the people of the country
because, upon that adjustment, depends the commercial interests
of the country. The adjustment of rates, along with the other pro-
blems which are now handled by the State and Federal Commis-
sions, would demand precisely the same solution that they are
receiving at present, but, with the Government owning the rail-
ways, then the powers of the State would cease entirely and the danger
would be that these questions would become political issues to be
settled by the action of the party majority at popular elections, rather
than by thecool, deliberate decision of those best qualified to settle
32Commissioner Clark, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, re-
cently spoke of the tremendous interest to the country of a successful and
broad policy of regulation for the carriers of the country, and referred to
the present dark days for the railroads and looked forward to a daw7n of
better times. (Railway Age Gazette, September 17th, 1915, p. 496.)
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such problems. And when we contemplate Government ownership
we are irresistibly led to the conclusions that, if Government regu-
lation is a failure, Government ownership will likewise prove fallacious
and, if Government regulation can be made successful, then the
reason for Government ownership is eliminated.
The Constitution, as the highest expression of the will of the
people, in our popular government, does not empower the Govern-
ment or the several States to, themselves, engage in commerce, but
Congress, by our Constitution, is given the power only to regulate
commerce.
This constitutional power should be exercised within the limits
imposed by the framers of our organic law, to the end that the
conditions which hamper the commerce of our country today may
be relieved so that our Government may sway the business of the
world tomorrow. The entire power and duty of regulation of
interstate carriers should be placed in the hands of the general
Government, except as to matters so essentially local that they can-
not be used to interfere with the efficiency of the service or the
just rights of the carrier. State control conflicts more and more
with other State control and, while State rights is all right in theory,
the making of railroad rates calls for such broad general treatment
as only the National body can give. The Federal Government
should also be given the exclusive power to supervise and regulate
the issue of stocks and bonds of carriers engaged in interstate com-
merce, to the end that the securities, now vitiated by the laws of
the different States, unless reasonable fees are paid for authority
to issue them, may be given a stability which is essential to the
financing of the business of the carriers. Thig, the carriers, the
investors and the general public have a right to demand, in the
name of Good Government.
Ve cannot separate the idea of Good Government from one
which furnishes proper protection to all who are subject and worthy
of its protection and regulation. A conflict between the authorities
by which this object is frustrated is, therefore, a mistaken idea
of Government. It is a right of all the States to have the Con-
stitution enforced, to the end that Congress may regulate com-
merce between the States and, if the representatives of the people
of any State or section usurp this constututional right of all the
States, then, to that extent, the fundamental law of our country
has been denied. The ancient distrust of the Federal Government
and the undue emphasis upon the rights of the States are responsible
for many of our existing legislative evils, and, according to the im-
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mutable decree of history, our States have not always been right in
the assertion of their power regarding personal rights. Notwith-
standing the urgent necessity that exists for uniform procedure,
divorce laws, negotiable instrument laws and uniform corporation
laws, our experience has shown that it is practically impossible to
secure concerted State action upon any of these subjects. In-
dividual freedom, the right to life, liberty and property and the
consummation of the higher aims of government are not always
consistent with the asserted prerogatives of our individual States.
Just as the power of the Federal Government was necessary in the
cause of humanity to free the country from the "peculiar institu-
tion" known as human slavery, maintained by an erroneous theory
of State's rights, so it is today essential to strike from the commerce
of the country the shackles of a bondage forged by ill-conceived State
regulation.
These ideas should be placed on a plane above the narrow limit
of prejudice or the arbitrary boundaries of any section or State,
to the end that we may always adhere to the correct doctrine pro-
claimed by Webster: "Liberty and Union, Now and Forever, One
and Inseparable," and enjoy the fullest measure of blessings incident
to this broad principle of our free Government.
The problems we have mentioned, following the advent of a
new departure of government into our complex civilization, are but
the natural results of untried human action along unblazed trails.
Regulation of the agencies of commerce is necessary both for the
public interest and to protect the commerce, itself, and, to the end
that these State and Federal agencies, which means so much to the
commercial prosperity of the country, may be administered in the
most efficient manner, the present conflicts between State and
Federal control should be eliminated and the regulation should be
conducted under Federal authority, as the Constitution provides.
EDWARD J. WHITE.
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